

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON

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March 20, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

FROM: David Klein

SUBJECT: The Soviet's "General Principles" on the Berlin Issue  
(SECTO 66)

The Secretary has already commented on the substance of Gromyko's "General Principles".

The paper is not forthcoming. The only hopeful signs, and these are indeed very few, include Gromyko's comment on a need for thorough discussion of the "Principles" in Geneva and his remarks concerning an ultimate endorsement of these "Principles" by heads of governments. At least discussions are still theoretically wide open.

On the substantive side, however, the Soviet peace treaty and "free city" proposals are very much intact. The Soviets did the expected about the NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression agreement, deliberately raising the issue of GDR recognition.

Also, paragraphs 4 and 5 of the referenced telegram seem particularly significant since they spelled out in some detail the ramifications of the concept of "respect for GDR sovereignty".

As Adzhubei indicated earlier to the President, the Soviets have redefined the International Access Authority to suit their own purposes. However, from their language, I would gather that there is considerable room for bargaining on this particular issue.

I personally am not as sanguine as our Delegation in Geneva seems to be about the question of Soviet troops in West Berlin. I think the formula for UN troops as opposed to neutral troops probably leaves the Soviet proposal ~~sentative~~ very much intact.

And one last point: from the context of paragraph 3 it seems that the Soviets are back on the gambit of a temporary arrangement lasting from three to five years.

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If the Soviets move at all, they probably will move slowly. They are essentially oriental tradesmen, with tremendous patience, and I would expect that whatever concessions may be forthcoming will have to come from Khrushchev himself.

I have seen the suggested revisions in our modus vivendi paper which I understand the Secretary will probably table today. In view of the Soviet performance thus far, however, I think it extremely important that we hold back, until some later point, the proposal on our acceptance of East Germans at the access control points. This is an important concession and it would seem to me that it should be held until there is some give on the Soviet side. Perhaps it should even be delayed until we have fully played out the International Access Authority concept.

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